Organon F (forthcoming)
|Abstract||In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation is not a requirement of rationality. However, it is a requirement of another kind, an agential requirement. I discuss how we can distinguish rational requirements from agential requirements, and why both kinds of requirements are important for understanding our expectations about individual agents.|
|Keywords||rationality enkrasia enkratic principle practical reason practical rationality ethics|
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