Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?

Organon F 20 (4):436-462 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.
Keywords rationality  enkrasia  enkratic principle  practical reason  practical rationality  ethics  akrasia  agency  internalism  broome
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