David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. OUP 167-183 (2013)
This paper argues that both a limited doxastic voluntarism and anti-evidentialism are consistent with the views that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that this aim plays an important role in norm-setting for beliefs. More cautiously, it argues that limited doxastic voluntarism is (or would be) a useful capacity for agents concerned with truth tracking to possess, and that having it would confer some straightforward benefits of both an epistemic and non-epistemic variety to an agent concerned with truth tracking.
|Keywords||Evidentialism Doxastic Voluntarism Ethics of Belief Theoretical Reasons Reasons Rationality Aim of Belief Theoretical Reason|
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Andrew Reisner (2015). Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
Christopher Cowie (2014). In Defence of Instrumentalism About Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.
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