Metaethics for Everyone

Problema 4:39-64 (2010)
As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in this paper is to split the difference between Dworkin’s view and more traditional views, concluding that Dworkin’s work in Justice for Hedgehogs contributes to metaethics for everyone.
Keywords Metaethics  Dworkin  Justice for Hedgehogs  Moral Realism  Cognitivism
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Eliot Michaelson (2012). Justice for Unicorns. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):351-360.
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