David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272 (2009)
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
|Keywords||Wrong kind of reasons Reasons for belief Evidentialism Theoretical reason Normativity Reasons Pragmatism|
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
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Citations of this work BETA
Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):n/a-n/a.
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). The No Guidance Argument. Theoria 79 (1):279-283.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Conor McHugh (2012). Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness. Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.
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