The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
Keywords Wrong kind of reasons  Reasons for belief  Evidentialism  Theoretical reason  Normativity  Reasons  Pragmatism
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Harman (1995). Rationality. In E. E. Smith & D. N. Osherson (eds.), Invitation to Cognitive Science. Mit Press.
Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.
Berislav Marušić (2011). The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.

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