The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272 (2009)
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
Keywords Wrong kind of reasons  Reasons for belief  Evidentialism  Theoretical reason  Normativity  Reasons  Pragmatism
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DOI 10.2307/27734478
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References found in this work BETA
Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Rinard (2015). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.

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