David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 93 (3):373 - 402 (1992)
Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) are rejected as implausible; the third (originally proposed by Kaplan in Dthat) is argued to be highly plausible.
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Jeffrey C. King (2014). Speaker Intentions in Context. Noûs 48 (2):219-237.
Stefano Predelli (2012). Bare-Boned Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.
Mark Phelan (2014). Experimental Pragmatics: An Introduction for Philosophers. Philosophy Compass 9 (1):66-79.
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