Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260 (2009)
|Abstract||This paper looks at the question of what form the requirements of practical rationality take. One common view is that the requirements of rationality are wide-scope, and another is that they are narrow-scope. I argue that the resolution to the question of wide-scope versus narrow-scope depends to a significant degree on what one expects a theory of rationality to do. In examining these expectations, I consider whether there might be a way to unify requirements of both forms into a single theory of rationality, and what the difficulties involved in doing so can teach us about the foundations of practical rationality|
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