Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
Keywords reasons  evidentialism  pragmatism  weighing  normativity  theoretical reasons  reasons for belief  belief
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    Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.
    Berislav Marušić (2011). The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.

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