Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27 (2008)
In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
Keywords reasons  evidentialism  pragmatism  weighing  normativity  theoretical reasons  reasons for belief  belief
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DOI 10.2307/40208857
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Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.

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