David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 125 (2):219-250 (2005)
Fodor argues that our minds must have epistemic limitations because there must be endogenous constraints on the class of concepts we can acquire. However, his argument for the existence of these endogenous constraints is falsified by the phenomenon of the deferential acquisition of concepts. If we allow for the acquisition of concepts through deferring to experts and scientific instruments, then our conceptual capacity will be without endogenous constraints, and there will be no reason to think that our minds are epistemically bounded
|Keywords||Acquisition Capacity Concept Epistemology Limitation Fodor, Jerry|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Paul Thagard (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Citations of this work BETA
Nathaniel Goldberg & Matthew Rellihan (2008). Incommensurability, Relativism, Scepticism: Reflections on Acquiring a Concept. Ratio 21 (2):147–167.
Michael Vlerick (2014). Biological Constraints Do Not Entail Cognitive Closure. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48:21-27.
Similar books and articles
Howard Sankey (2010). Descartes's Language Test and Ape Language Research. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):111-123.
Dunja Jutronic (2001). Is There a Third Way of Concept Acquisition? Acta Analytica 16 (26):97-108.
Daniel A. Weiskopf & William P. Bechtel (2004). Remarks on Fodor on Having Concepts. Mind and Language 19 (1):48-56.
Lawrence J. Kaye (1993). Are Most of Our Concepts Innate? Synthese 2 (2):187-217.
Fiona Cowie (1998). Mad Dog Nativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):227-252.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2011). Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition. Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539.
Andre Kukla (1993). Epistemic Boundedness. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):121 – 126.
John Sarnecki (2006). Retracing Our Steps: Fodor's New Old Way with Concept Acquisition. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #114,917 of 1,792,815 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #207,535 of 1,792,815 )
How can I increase my downloads?