Epistemic boundedness and the universality of thought

Philosophical Studies 125 (2):219-250 (2005)
Fodor argues that our minds must have epistemic limitations because there must be endogenous constraints on the class of concepts we can acquire. However, his argument for the existence of these endogenous constraints is falsified by the phenomenon of the deferential acquisition of concepts. If we allow for the acquisition of concepts through deferring to experts and scientific instruments, then our conceptual capacity will be without endogenous constraints, and there will be no reason to think that our minds are epistemically bounded
Keywords Acquisition  Capacity  Concept  Epistemology  Limitation  Fodor, Jerry
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References found in this work BETA
Frederick R. Adams (2002). Mental Representation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
Michael Devitt (1981). Designation. Columbia University Press.

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