On 'Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):347-351 (2010)
Abstract
I argue that Diaz-Leon fails to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Stoljar's criticism because she fails to give us any general reasons for thinking that conditionals that involve psychologically distinct concepts could be a priori
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,768
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
E. Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
Brian Loar (2003). Qualia, Properties, Modality. Philosophical Issues 1 (1):113-29.
Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-07-27

Total downloads

34 ( #50,041 of 1,098,979 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #43,600 of 1,098,979 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.