The Distinction between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How

Philosophia 40 (4):857-875 (2012)
Abstract
I first argue why Stanley and Williamson fail to eliminate the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Then I argue that knowledge-how consists in a special kind of ways of thinking of ways of engaging in actions. So the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how is twofold: the objects of knowledge-that and knowledge-how are different; the ways in which we entertain the object of knowledge are also distinct when we have knowledge-that and knowledge-how. At the end, I consider two recent intellectualist efforts on knowledge-how and show why they fail.
Keywords Knowledge-how  Intellectualism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,449
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1945). Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.

View all 8 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743-747.
Mark McCullagh (2000). Solitary and Embedded Knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):161-169.
John Hyman (1999). How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):433-451.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-02-23

Total downloads

41 ( #42,554 of 1,103,221 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #21,161 of 1,103,221 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.