|Abstract||Purpose. Although observers easily extract the global meaning of natural scenes, it is often the case that they do not notice or remember all of their individual properties. It appears that some scene properties are more readily coded in mental representations than others. We tested the role of three different object properties - color, location, and presence/absence - in scene representations.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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