Visual sensing without seeing
Psychological Science 15:27-32 (2004)
| Abstract | It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., _seeing_). It is shown here that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesMichael Tye (2009). The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
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