David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130 (2009)
Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion , according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion , which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, constitutive assertoric norms constrain how one must react if an interlocutor challenges one's assertion, but they do not constrain what one should assert in the first place. I argue that the non-restrictive dialectical perspective can accommodate various linguistic phenomena commonly taken to support the restrictive model. 1.
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2012). Discursive Justification and Skepticism. Synthese 189 (2):373-394.
John Turri (2013). Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion. Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
E. J. Coffman (2011). Two Claims About Epistemic Propriety. Synthese 181 (3):471-488.
Rachel McKinnon (2012). How Do You Know That 'How Do You Know?' Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83.
John Turri (2013). The Test of Truth: An Experimental Investigation of the Norm of Assertion. Cognition 129 (2):279-291.
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