Assertion and its constitutive norms
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130 (2009)
| Abstract | Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion , according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion , which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, constitutive assertoric norms constrain how one must react if an interlocutor challenges one's assertion, but they do not constrain what one should assert in the first place. I argue that the non-restrictive dialectical perspective can accommodate various linguistic phenomena commonly taken to support the restrictive model. 1. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMichael Rescorla (2009). Epistemic and Dialectical Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.
R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.
Herman Cappelen (2011). Against Assertion. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Adam Leite (2007). How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
Scott F. Aikin (2006). Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
David Owens (2006). Testimony and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105 - 129.
Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
Michael Rescorla (2007). A Linguistic Reason for Truthfulness. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts. Routledge.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-03-18Total downloads92 ( #7,326 of 548,969 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,091 of 548,969 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
