David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):703-721 (2012)
The formal conception of computation (FCC) holds that computational processes are not sensitive to semantic properties. FCC is popular, but it faces well-known difficulties. Accordingly, authors such as Block and Peacocke pursue a ?semantically-laden? alternative, according to which computation can be sensitive to semantics. I argue that computation is insensitive to semantics within a wide range of computational systems, including any system with ?derived? rather than ?original? intentionality. FCC yields the correct verdict for these systems. I conclude that there is only one promising strategy for semantically-laden theorists: identify special computational systems that help generate their own semantic properties, and then show that computation within those systems is semantically-laden. Unfortunately, the few existing discussions that pursue this strategy are problematic
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Tyler Burge (2010). Origins of Objectivity. OUP Oxford.
James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Rescorla (2014). The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):173-208.
Similar books and articles
Michael Rescorla (2013). Against Structuralist Theories of Computational Implementation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):681-707.
Murat Aydede (2000). Computation and Intentional Psychology. Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.
Eric Dietrich (1989). Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Computational Psychology. Synthese 79 (April):119-41.
Rick Grush (2001). The Semantic Challenge to Computational Neuroscience. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press 155--172.
Amir Horowitz (2007). Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computation Without Representation. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
David J. Chalmers (2011). A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
Chris Fox (2005). Foundations of Intensional Semantics. Blackwell Pub..
Matthew Stuart Piper (2012). You Can't Eat Causal Cake with an Abstract Fork: An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):154-90.
Mary Litch (1997). Computation, Connectionism and Modelling the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):357-364.
Michael Losonsky (1995). Emdedded Systems Vs. Individualism. Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.
Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Mark Burgin (eds.) (forthcoming). INFORMATION AND COMPUTATION. World Scientific.
Henry Jackman (2007). Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. OUP Oxford
Added to index2011-10-06
Total downloads36 ( #91,119 of 1,725,989 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #74,830 of 1,725,989 )
How can I increase my downloads?