David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 59 (3):498-507 (1992)
This discussion adjudicates a dispute between Larry Laudan and Gerald Doppelt over the nature of methodological rules. Laudan holds that all methodological rules are hypothetical imperatives, while Doppelt argues that a subset of those rules, basic methodological standards, are not hypothetical imperatives. I argue that neither writer offers a satisfactory account of methodological rules and that their reliance on the hypothetical/nonhypothetical distinction does not advance our understanding of methodological rules. I propose that we dispense with this dubious distinction and develop an alternative account of scientific norms
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David Resnik (1994). Epistemic Value: Truth or Explanation? Metaphilosophy 25 (4):348-361.
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