In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell (2009)
|Abstract||Philosophers love a priori knowledge: we delight in truths that can be known from the comfort of our armchairs, without the need to venture out in the world for confirmation. This is due not to laziness, but to two different considerations. First, it seems that many philosophical issues aren’t settled by our experience of the world — the nature of morality; the way concepts pick out objects; the structure of our experience of the world in which we find ourselves — these issues seem to be decided not on the basis of our experience, but in some manner by things prior to (or independently of) that experience. Second, even when we are deeply interested in how our experience lends credence to our claims about the world, the matter remains of the remainder: we learn more about how experience contributes to knowledge when we see what knowledge is available independent of that experience.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
A. Casullo (2010). Knowledge and Modality. Synthese 172 (3).
D. Gene Witmer (2006). How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
David Henderson (2000). What Is a Priori and What Is It Good For? Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):51-86.
John Turri (2011). Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
Hamid Vahid (1999). A Priori Knowledge, Experience and Defeasibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):173 – 188.
Jennifer Nagel (2000). The Empiricist Conception of Experience. Philosophy 75 (3):345-376.
Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #40,850 of 549,090 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,722 of 549,090 )
How can I increase my downloads?