Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Proponents of “truth-value glut” responses to the paradoxes of self-reference, such as Priest [6, 7] argue that “truth-value gap” analyses of the paradoxes fall foul of the strengthened liar paradox: “this sentence is not true.” If we pay attention to the role of assertion and denial and the behaviour of negation in both “gap” and “glut” analyses, we see that the situation with these approaches has a pleasing symmetry: gap approaches take some denials to fail to be expressible by negation, and glut approaches take some negations to not express denials. But in the light of this symmetry, considerations against a gap view point to parallel considerations against a glut view. Those who find some reason to prefer one view over another (and this is almost everyone) must find some reason to break this symmetry|
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