Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 26 (1):25-30 (1959)
|Abstract||This article consists in a critical examination of an argument which purports to prove that many scientific hypotheses held to be probable are actually certain. The argument rests on the assumption that since the nonphilosopher would say of many scientific hypotheses that they are certain and would deny that the best-established hypotheses are merely probable, philosophers who say that no scientific hypotheses are certain must be mistaken. Examination reveals that the argument fails to take account of the technical nature of the claim that even the best-established hypotheses are probable|
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