Copeland and Proudfoot on computability

Abstract
Many philosophers contend that Turing’s work provides a conceptual analysis of numerical computability. In (Rescorla, 2007), I dissented. I argued that the problem of deviant notations stymies existing attempts at conceptual analysis. Copeland and Proudfoot respond to my critique. I argue that their putative solution does not succeed. We are still awaiting a genuine conceptual analysis
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References found in this work BETA
B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2010). Deviant Encodings and Turing's Analysis of Computability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):247-252.
Stewart Shapiro (1982). Acceptable Notation. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1):14-20.
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