Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):474-483 (2001)
Shapiro and Taschek have argued that simply using intuitionistic logic and its Heyting semantics, one can show that there are no gaps in warranted assertability. That is, given that a discourse is faithfully modeled using Heyting's semantics for the logical constants, then if a statement _S
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