David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (3):123-140 (2012)
This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing the computations characteristic of understanding Chinese actually understands Chinese. The supposition that the Man does not understand Chinese has gone virtually unquestioned in this foundational debate. The persons reply acknowledges the intuitive power behind that supposition, but knows that brute intuitions are not epistemically sacrosanct. Like many intuitions humans have had, and later deposed, this intuition does not withstand experimental scrutiny. The second part of the persons reply consequently holds that computational cognitive science is confirmed by the Chinese Room thought experiment.
|Keywords||Chinese Room Turing Test psycholinguistics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 1: The Human Computer. Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (1):27-48.
Hanoch Ben-Yami (1993). A Note on the Chinese Room. Synthese 95 (2):169-72.
Peter Kugel (2004). The Chinese Room is a Trick. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):153-154.
Norman Y. Teng (2000). A Cognitive Analysis of the Chinese Room Argument. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):313-24.
Jason Ford (2011). Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.
Koji Tanaka (2004). Minds, Programs, and Chinese Philosophers: A Chinese Perspective on the Chinese Room. Sophia 43 (1):61-72.
Jerry A. Fodor (1991). Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room. In D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Stevan Harnad (1989). Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 (4):5-25.
Herbert A. Simon & Stuart A. Eisenstadt (2003). A Chinese Room That Understands. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2012-02-12
Total downloads73 ( #20,536 of 1,099,746 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #40,456 of 1,099,746 )
How can I increase my downloads?