Discrete state systems, Markov chains, and problems in the theory of scientific explanation and prediction
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 30 (4):325-345 (1963)
Recent discussions in the philosophy of science have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of conceptual issues relating to the methodology of explanation and prediction in the sciences. Part of this literature has been devoted to clarifying the very ideas of explanation and prediction. But the discussion has also ranged over various related topics, including the status of laws to be used for explanatory and predictive purposes, the logical interrelationships between explanatory and predictive reasonings, the differences in the strategy of explanatory argumentation in different branches of science, the nature and possibility of teleological explanation, etc. The aim of the present article is to examine the issues involved in such questions from the specialized perspective afforded by one particular kind of physical systems--namely, systems, here to be characterized as discrete state systems, whose behavior has been studied extensively in the scientific literature under the general heading of Markov chains. These systems have been chosen as our focus because their behavior over time can be analyzed at once with great ease and with extraordinary precision
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Jonathan Fuller, Alex Broadbent & Luis J. Flores (2015). Prediction in Epidemiology and Medicine. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C.
Heather Douglas (2010). Engagement for Progress: Applied Philosophy of Science in Context. Synthese 177 (3):317-335.
Lennart Åqvist (1989). On the Logic of Causally Necessary and Sufficient Conditions: Towards a Theory of Motive-Explanations of Human Actions. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 31 (1):43 - 75.
Jan Doroszewski (1980). Hypothetico-Nomological Aspects of Medical Diagnosis Part I: General Structure of the Diagnostic Process and its Hypothesis-Directed Stage. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (2):177-194.
Jonathan Fuller, Alex Broadbent & Luis J. Flores (2015). Prediction in Epidemiology and Medicine. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 54:45-48.
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