Epistemic and dialectical regress

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60 (2009)
Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defence when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious 'regress of justifications', since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum . To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defence in the light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome and that egalitarianism can handle it quite satisfactorily. I also defend a positive view that combines an anti-foundationalist conception of dialectical interaction with a foundationalist conception of epistemic justification.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400802215653
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,316
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Michael Rescorla (2009). Assertion and its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
Ben Bronner (2013). Assertions Only? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):44-52.
Joshua May (2013). Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

63 ( #76,151 of 1,926,202 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #73,045 of 1,926,202 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.