Multiple Realizability and Novel Causal Powers

Abstracta 6 (2):216-230 (2012)
Abstract Framed within the dialectic of the causal exclusion argument (Kim 2005), this paper does two things. One, it clarifies some properties of multiple realizability based on its true origin (Turing 1950). And two, it challenges a form of argument Noordhof (1997), Clarke (1999), and Whittle (2007) employ to support the idea that the mental has causal powers not had by its physical realization base (Novel). The paper challenges Novel with ideas derived from multiple realizability, among others.
Keywords multiple realizability  causal powers  reduction  Turing  pain
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