David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):211-230 (2000)
According to one tradition in realist philosophy, 'truthmaking' amounts to necessitation. That is, an object x is a truthmaker for the claim A if x exists, and the existence of x necessitates the truth of A. I argued in my paper "Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity" , that if we wish to use this account of truthmaking, we ought understand the entailment connective "=>" in such a claim as a relevant entailment, in the tradition of Anderson and Belnap and their co-workers [1, 2, 8, 11]. Furthermore, I proposed a number of theses about truthmaking as necessitation. The most controversial of these is the disjunction thesis: x makes a disjunction A v B true if and only if it makes one of the disjuncts (A or B) true. That paper left one important task unfinished. I did not explain how the theses about truthmaking could be true together. In this paper I give a consistency proof, by providing a model for the theses of truthmaking in my earlier paper. This result does two things. First, it shows that the theses of truthmaking are jointly consistent. Second, it provides an independently philosophically motivated formal model for relevant logics in the 'possible worlds' tradition of Routley and Meyer [8, 16, 17].
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Gustavo Picazo (2014). Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory. Philosophia 42 (3):713-739.
Similar books and articles
Peter Schulte (2011). Truthmakers: A Tale of Two Explanatory Projects. Synthese 181 (3):413-431.
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Javier Kalhat (2008). A Critique of Armstrong's Truthmaking Account of Possibility. Acta Analytica 23 (2):161-176.
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2011). Presentism and Truthmaking. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
Stephen Read (2000). Truthmakers and the Disjunction Thesis. Mind 109 (432):67-80.
Ingvar Johansson (2004). Truthmaking: A Cognition-Independent Internal Relation with Heterogeneous Relata. In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 154--56.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009). The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses. Mind 118 (470):427-443.
Robin Stenwall (2010). Causal Truthmaking. Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
D. M. Armstrong (2000). Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking. The Monist 83 (1):150-160.
Greg Restall (1996). Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads80 ( #53,165 of 1,906,986 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #49,342 of 1,906,986 )
How can I increase my downloads?