David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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A striking thesis lies at the core of Davidson‟s philosophy: when we attribute intentional content to another creature‟s mental states and speech acts, we must treat the creature as largely conforming to our own rational norms. I will discuss how this thesis informs Davidson‟s treatment of rationality and intentionality. After reviewing some historical background, I present basic aspects of Davidson‟s position. I then examine various worries about the position. I conclude by highlighting some key Davidsonian insights into rationality
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