Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-nor-Bad

Cambridge University Press (2006)
Abstract
Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalized, practical, and demystified account of good and bad, and right and wrong. Professor Reshotko presents a newly-envisioned Socratic theory residing at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It makes an important contribution to the study of the Platonic dialogues and will also interest all scholars of ethics and moral psychology.
Keywords Virtue
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $28.18 used (79% off)   $33.38 new (8% off)   $34.09 direct from Amazon (6% off)    Amazon page
Call number B318.V57.R47 2006
ISBN(s) 0521124263   0521846188   9780521846189
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,304
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

10 ( #137,947 of 1,096,442 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #231,754 of 1,096,442 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.