David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2006)
Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalized, practical, and demystified account of good and bad, and right and wrong. Professor Reshotko presents a newly-envisioned Socratic theory residing at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It makes an important contribution to the study of the Platonic dialogues and will also interest all scholars of ethics and moral psychology.
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|Call number||B318.V57.R47 2006|
|ISBN(s)||0521124263 0521846188 9780521846189 9780521124263|
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Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2014). I—The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behaviour. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):185-218.
Russell E. Jones (2012). Rational and Nonrational Desires in Meno and Protagoras. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):224-233.
Christopher Rowe (2012). Socrates on Reason, Appetite and Passion: A Response to Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (3):305-324.
Thomas F. Morris (2014). Why Socrates Does Not Request Exile in the Apology. Heythrop Journal 55 (1):73-85.
Iakovos Vasiliou (2014). Platonic Virtue: An Alternative Approach. Philosophy Compass 9 (9):605-614.
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