Truth values and proof theory

Studia Logica 92 (2):241 - 264 (2009)
I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
Keywords Truth Value  Proof  Sequent Calculus  Completeness  Intuitionistic Logic  Modal Logic
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (1979). The Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Greg Restall (2005). Multiple Conclusions. In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. College Publications
Robert Brandom (2007). Inferentialism and Some of its Challenges. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):651-676.

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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Restall (2014). Pluralism and Proofs. Erkenntnis 79 (S2):279-291.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2015). Logic Reduced To Bare Bones. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (2):193-209.

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