David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):422-423 (2003)
The Gestalt Bubble model of visual consciousness is a courageous attempt to take the first-person perspective as primary in the study of consciousness. I have developed similar ideas as the Virtual Reality Metaphor of consciousness (Revonsuo 1995; 2000). I can, hence, only agree with Lehar about the general shape of a proper research strategy for the study of consciousness. As to the metaphysical basis of the research program, I have, however, several reservations about panexperientialism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Uriah Kriegel (2007). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Antti Revonsuo (1999). Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1).
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
Antti Revonsuo (2000). Prospects for a Scientific Research Program on Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Antti Revonsuo (2003). The Contents of Phenomenal Consciousness: One Relation to Rule Them All and in the Unity Bind Them. Psyche 9 (8).
Antti Revonsuo (2010). Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity. Psychology Press.
Chuck Stieg (2009). Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? Cogprints 51 (4):152-61.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). The Difference That Self-Consciousness Makes. In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons: Metaphysical Research, Volume 1. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #51,632 of 1,410,532 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #108,810 of 1,410,532 )
How can I increase my downloads?