David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):387-405 (1993)
The cognitive mind-brain is haunted by the ghost of consciousness. Cognitive science must face this ghost, since consciousness is perhaps the most important mental phenomenon: it forms a seemingly united, multimodal phenomenological world around the subject who experiences this world from a certain point of view. Many current approaches to consciousness fail to illuminate the nature of this “experienced world”. Some philosophers want to eliminate consciousness from science for good, others build theories in which the concept of consciousness is distorted beyond recognition. I argue that elimination and Daniel Dennett's “multiple drafts” model do not offer genuine explanations for consciousness. However, certain empirically-based approaches to consciousness succeed in exorcising its ghostly reputation and, at the same time, in preserving the experienced world of consciousness as an important explanandum.
|Keywords||Brain Cognitive Consciousness Mental Metaphysics Mind Science Dennett, D|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness Without Conflation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
N. F. Dixon (1995). Breakthrough on the Consciousness Front or Much Ado About Nothing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253.
Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma (1995). Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271.
Andrew W. Young (1995). More on Prosopagnosia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271.
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