Fodor's ingratitude and change of heart?
Mind and Language 19 (1):70-84 (2004)
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| Keywords | Computationalism Content Metaphysics Mind Fodor, J | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJerome C. Wakefield (2003). The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
Michael Devitt (1991). Why Fodor Can't Have It Both Ways. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
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A. Levine & Mark H. Bickhard (1999). Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):5-23.
John Perry & David J. Israel (1991). Fodor and Psychological Explanation. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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