Knowing how to believe with justification

Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292 (1991)
Abstract
Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills
Keywords Belief  Cognition  Epistemology  Experience  Perception
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