Realism and the meaning of 'real'

Noûs 40 (3):468–494 (2006)
A new account of the semantic function (character) of ‘real’ and ‘really’ is defended. ‘Really’ as a sentential operator typically indicates that a report of what has been represented elsewhere ends and subsequent discourse is to be taken as making claims about the world. ‘Real’ and ‘really’ as applied to nouns or predicate phrases indicate that something is not being called an F merely because it represents an F. A way of drawing the distinction between realism and anti-realism based on this new account is also defended.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00620.x
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