Resisting normativism in psychology
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell (2007)
“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in the natural sciences. Thus, according to Normativism, whether or not someone thinks that fish sleep, or even can represent fish at all, depends upon making a judgment about the person’s goodness or rationality, of a sort that would not be involved in merely determining whether or not fish in fact sleep
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Elizabeth Schechter (2013). Two Unities of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):197-218.
Elizabeth Schechter (2015). The Subject in Neuropsychology: Individuating Minds in the Split‐Brain Case. Mind and Language 30 (5):501-525.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Nature of Normativity: A Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.
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