The argument from illusion

Noûs 34 (4):604-621 (2000)
Abstract
In an attempt to revive discussion of the argument from illusion this paper amends the classic version of the argument to avoid Austin's main objection. It then develops and defends a version of the intentional object reply to the argument, arguing that an "unendorsed story" account of reports of dreams and hallucinations avoids commitment to nonexistent objects.
Keywords Argument  Epistemology  Experience  Illusion  Austin
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00280
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Peter Slezak (2002). The Tripartite Model of Representation. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):239-270.

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