The argument from illusion

Noûs 34 (4):604-621 (2000)
In an attempt to revive discussion of the argument from illusion this paper amends the classic version of the argument to avoid Austin's main objection. It then develops and defends a version of the intentional object reply to the argument, arguing that an "unendorsed story" account of reports of dreams and hallucinations avoids commitment to nonexistent objects
Keywords Argument  Epistemology  Experience  Illusion  Austin
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00280
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,651
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Peter Slezak (2002). The Tripartite Model of Representation. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):239-270.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

100 ( #45,956 of 1,902,751 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #44,317 of 1,902,751 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.