David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):79-93 (2008)
This paper discusses Plato’s question from the Meno : Why should we prefer knowledge that p over mere true belief that p? I find I just do prefer knowledge, and not for any further benefit that I am aware of in the particular case. But I should have that preference, because given our practice of approving of testimony only if uttered with knowledge, I could fail to prefer knowledge, when other things seem to me to be equal, only by having the sorts of serious social or psychological defects that would make me unresponsive to the approval of others. Finally, the social practice that produces this particular preference is good for all of us because it improves the average quality of the testimony we receive, which results in greater success in our projects.
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
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