Judgment and the reification of the faculties: A reconstructive reading of Arendt's Life of the Mind
Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (1-2):157-176 (2008)
|Abstract||The core argument in this paper is that, to reconstruct the last unwritten section on Judging in Hannah Arendt's Life of the Mind , it is necessary to address what Arendt was doing with the book as a whole and how the different parts relate internally to one another. This is no easy matter, especially as the existing sections on Thinking and Willing are quite different in tone from one another. My proposition is that the work should be read as a critique of the life of the `modern' mind, and especially of the differentiation of the modern mind into distinct and reified faculties. The work as a whole is an attempt to understand the distorted forms of modernization that result from the division of the life of the mind into opposing faculties. It is, so to speak, a critique of the combined and uneven development of the life of the modern mind. While Arendt famously argues that the activity of thinking itself conditions people against evildoing, the spectre that informs her analysis of both thinking and willing is the danger of nihilism inherent in these mental activities. The work raises vital questions concerning the conditions under which this danger is actualized and the means by which it might be averted. What this entails for our reconstruction of the missing section on judgment is that, rather than see it as the core of Arendt's contribution to political thought or as the promised solution to an impasse, we should explore the equivocations of judging. This aporetic reading of the text helps clarify Arendt's concerns over the separation of the life of the mind from the world and the role of both judging and understanding in renewing its connections to the world|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Fred L. Rush Jr (2001). The Harmony of the Faculties. Kant-Studien 92 (1):38-61.
Hannah Arendt (2003). Responsibility and Judgment. Schocken Books.
Craig Reeves (2009). 'Exploding the Limits of Law': Judgment and Freedom in Arendt and Adorno. Res Publica 15 (2):137-164.
Ronald Beiner (1997). Rereading Hannah Arendt's Kant Lectures. Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 (1):21-32.
Garrath Williams (2007). Ethics and Human Relationality: Between Arendt's Accounts of Morality. HannahArendt.Net 3.
Linda M. G. Zerilli (2005). "We Feel Our Freedom": Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt. Political Theory 33 (2):158 - 188.
Dana Richard Villa (ed.) (2000). The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt. Cambridge University Press.
Avery Goldman (2010). An Antinomy of Political Judgment: Kant, Arendt, and the Role of Purposiveness in Reflective Judgment. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 43 (3):331-352.
Dianna Taylor (2002). Hannah Arendt on Judgement: Thinking for Politics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2):151 – 169.
A. Degryse (2011). Sensus Communis as a Foundation for Men as Political Beings: Arendt's Reading of Kant's Critique of Judgment. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (3):345-358.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads3 ( #213,130 of 722,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?