Formal legal truth and substantive truth in judicial fact-finding -- their justified divergence in some particular cases

Law and Philosophy 18 (5):497-511 (1999)
Abstract
Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, `substantive' as distinct from `formal legal' truth. But problems of evidence, for example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lead to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. `Jury nullification' and `jury equity'. Limits of time, and definitiveness of decision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality is variable within a system and across systems.
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