David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 6 (23):347 - 364 (1931)
One of the great difficulties in effecting a synthesis of experience is the contradiction of the apparently mechanical character of the physical universe on the one hand, and the sense of freedom we associate with life on the other. In our own persons, we are told by medical science, or some of it, we are governed by physiological laws which are mechanical, as distinct from vital, in their nature. The best reconciliation of these with freedom, in the writer's opinion, is the philosophy of Samuel Butler. In studying freedom as experienced by human beings Butler pointed out that a large number of practices which are apparently mechanical are really habits that have become stereotyped, and he drew attention to the fact that human actions can be classified as follows:—
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jacques Montangero (1985). Genetic Epistemology: Yesterday and Today. Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York.
Nicholas Shea (2011). Developmental Systems Theory Formulated as a Claim About Inherited Representations. Philosophy of Science 78 (1):60-82.
Matteo Mameli (2004). Nongenetic Selection and Nongenetic Inheritance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):35-71.
Nicholas Shea (2012). Inherited Representations Are Read in Development. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-31.
Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz (2000). How the Mind Grows: A Developmental Perspective on the Biology of Cognition. Synthese 122 (1-2):29-51.
Richard F. Kitchener (1985). Genetic Epistemology, History of Science and Genetic Psychology. Synthese 65 (1):3 - 31.
Radu J. Bogdan (1993). The Architectural Nonchalance of Commonsense Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.
Jan Almäng (2007). Intentionality and Intersubjectivity. Göteborgs Universitet.
Ash Gobar (1968). Philosophic Foundations Of Genetic Psychology And Gestalt Psychology. Martinus Nilboff.
Nicholas Shea (2012). Genetic Representation Explains the Cluster of Innateness-Related Properties. Mind and Language 27 (4):466-493.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-08-10
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?