David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy 51 (195):5 - 20 (1976)
The objectivist claims that moral judgments are statements which are true or false. He may be a naturalist or an anti-Naturalist. If a naturalist, He may maintain either that moral properties are natural properties, Or that, Though moral properties are distinct from natural properties, Possession of natural properties sometimes entails possession of moral properties. The only plausible objectivist position is the latter form of naturalism. Various arguments against objectivism are considered, Including the argument that moral matters cannot be settled by argument and the argument that agreement about moral matters involves agreement in attitude, Whereas agreement about factual matters does not. All these arguments are shown to fail. Finally a positive argument in favor of objectivism is put forward
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David Enoch (2009). How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15 - 50.
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David Enoch (2009). How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
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