David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 34 (1):1 - 21 (1991)
Mechanism is the thesis that men can be considered as machines, that there is no essential difference between minds and machines.John Lucas has argued that it is a consequence of Gödel's theorem that mechanism is false. Men cannot be considered as machines, because the intellectual capacities of men are superior to that of any machine. Lucas claims that we can do something that no machine can do-namely to produce as true the Gödel-formula of any given machine. But no machine can prove its own Gödel-formula.
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