Paradoxien und die vergegenständlichung Von begriffen – zu freges unterscheidung zwischen begriff – und gegenstand

Erkenntnis 47 (1):7-35 (1997)
In this paper I discuss Frege's distinction between objects and concepts and suggest a solution of Frege's paradox of the concept horse. The expression ''the concept horse'' is not eliminated and the concept is not identified with its extension, but the concept is identified with the sense of the corresponding predicate. This solution fits better into a fregean ontology and philosophy of language than alternative solutions and allows for a general answer to the question why Frege's system is infected with Russell's paradox. Russell's paradox is caused by the reification of a concept. Certain problems of modern set theory seem to have a similar cause.Eine weithin sichtbare Warnungstafel muss aufgerichtet.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005387706926
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