David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):41-62 (2009)
The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God’s memories as truthmakers for truths about the past. I conclude that presentists have, in the truthmaker objection, considerable incentive to endorse theism.
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Citations of this work BETA
A. R. J. Fisher (2015). Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.
Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2011). Presentism and Truthmaking. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
Jamin Asay & Sam Baron (2014). The Hard Road to Presentism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335.
Neil McKinnon & John Bigelow (2012). Presentism, and Speaking of the Dead. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):253-263.
A. R. J. Fisher (2015). Truthmaking and Fundamentality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
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