Probability, Truth, and the Openness of the Future

Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):197-204 (2010)
Alexander Pruss’s recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. Contra Pruss, there is no conflict between OF, which holds that there are no true future contingent propositions (FCPs), and the high credence we place in some FCPs. When due attention is paid to the semantics of FCPs, to the relation of epistemic to objective probabilities, and to the distinction between truth simpliciter and truth at a time, it becomes clear that what we have good reason for believing is not that some FCPs are true, but rather that some FCPs have a good chance of becoming true
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil201027218
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