Vindication of the Rights of Machine
| Abstract | In this paper, I argue that certain Machines can have rights independently of whether they are sentient, or conscious, or whatever you might call it. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Machine Rights Turing Test Artificial Intelligence Rights | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesSaul Traiger (2000). Making the Right Identification in the Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):561-572.
Stevan Harnad (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.
Justin Leiber (2006). Turing's Golden: How Well Turing's Work Stands Today. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):13-46.
E. Ronald & Moshe Sipper (2001). Intelligence is Not Enough: On the Socialization of Talking Machines. Minds and Machines 11 (4):567-576.
Dale Jacquette (1987). Metamathematical Criteria for Minds and Machines. Erkenntnis 27 (July):1-16.
Justin Leiber (1995). On Turing's Turing Test and Why the Matter Matters. Synthese 104 (1):59-69.
Huma Shah & Kevin Warwick (2010). From the Buzzing in Turing’s Head to Machine Intelligence Contests. In TCIT 2010 / AISB 2010 Convention.
Dale Jacquette (1993). Who's Afraid of the Turing Test? Behavior and Philosophy 20 (21):63-74.
Robert M. French (1990). Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test. Mind 99 (393):53-66.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-10-10Total downloads105 ( #5,576 of 549,196 )Recent downloads (6 months)38 ( #967 of 549,196 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
