Moral understanding and knowledge

Philosophical Studies 172 (1):113-128 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral understanding is a species of knowledge. Understanding why an action is wrong, for example, amounts to knowing why the action is wrong. The claim that moral understanding is immune to luck while moral knowledge is not does not withstand scrutiny; nor does the idea that there is something deep about understanding for there are different degrees of understanding. It is also mistaken to suppose that grasping is a distinct psychological state that accompanies understanding. To understand why something is the case is to grasp or see why something is the case and grasping and seeing are ways of knowing

Similar books and articles

Is understanding a species of knowledge?Stephen R. Grimm - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
How understanding makes knowledge valuable.Ayca Boylu - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):591-609.
Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do.Refeng Tang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Understanding, Knowledge, and Scientific Antirealism.Kareem Khalifa - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):93-112.
Understanding as Knowledge of Meaning.Alex Barber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):964-977.
Logical knowledge and Gettier cases.Corine Besson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):1-19.
No understanding without explanation.Michael Strevens - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):510-515.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-05-22

Downloads
950 (#13,845)

6 months
123 (#27,158)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Amber Riaz
LUMS, Pakistan

Citations of this work

Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding.Michael Hannon - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):269-290.
IV—Understanding and Knowing.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74.
Understanding: not know-how.Emily Sullivan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):221-240.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.

View all 19 references / Add more references