Abstract

The theme of this paper was inspired by studies related to the subject of my doctoral dissertation,1 and, more specifically, by the work of A. Richardson and M. Friedman on the same subject presented in their two recently published books.2 The material in these books which addresses the connection between Russell and Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt reveals the same basic perspective in both authors and, in fact, represents the first in depth enquiry of this connection, despite certain fairly essential limitations which I hope to reveal in this paper. The line of investigation I intend to take in the following may therefore be outlined as such; to examine, albeit briefly, the extent to which Richardson’s and Friedman’s perspective can offer us a correct historical and philosophical approach to the influence of Russell’s philosophy on the Aufbau, and, by confirming the existence of the limitations alluded to, to determine whether this perspective may be adequately reformulated independently of their existence, and to determine how, in general terms, it may in fact be reformulated. Thus, although my analyses and commentaries do not fall within a strictly historiographical framework, as is the case in the work developed by Richardson and Friedman, it is nevertheless possible to achieve certain objectives characteristic of this framework which, eventually, may become the subject of a future historiography of the philosophy of Russell and his influence on the Aufbau.3 In order to achieve these objectives my main aim is neither negative nor destructive but essentially philosophical; I see myself together with the authors in question as partners in the investigation and resolution of problems arising from the presentation, discussion and testing of competitive theories, an example of what occurs in the scientific enquiry. In these circumstances, and from this point of view, I see myself as a philosopher who points to certain difficulties and problems in the theory put forward by these authors to explain the Aufbau, and, with particular reference to Russell’s philosophy, concludes by suggesting an alternative theory