David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavior and Philosophy 34:109 - 121 (2006)
Language has been traditionally considered as a special psychological or behavioral phenomenon, with a logical status similar to other phenomena such as learning, memory, and thinking. Based on Wittgenstein's notion of language game, I argue that language is not limited to a psychological phenomenon, but rather it constitutes the functional dimensions under which human behavior develops and becomes meaningful. I propose three dimensions of language relevant to human behavior: a) as a medium, b) as an instrument, and c) as a form of life.
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