David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 75 (5):526-536 (2008)
Multiple realization historically mandated the autonomy of psychology, and its principled irreducibility to neuroscience. Recently, multiple realization and its implications for the reducibility of psychology to neuroscience have been challenged. One challenge concerns the proper understanding of reduction. Another concerns whether multiple realization is as pervasive as is alleged. I focus on the latter question. I illustrate multiple realization with actual, rather than hypothetical, cases of multiple realization from within the biological sciences. Though they do support a degree of autonomy for higher levels of explanation and organization, they do not have the dire consequences critics of multiple realization fear. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH 45221‐0374; e‐mail: email@example.com.
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Citations of this work BETA
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Who's Afraid of Nagelian Reduction? Erkenntnis 73 (3):393-412.
Mark Bauer (2013). Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):446-464.
Björn Brunnander (2013). Natural Selection and Multiple Realisation: A Closer Look. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):73 - 83.
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