David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):19-34 (2007)
This article explores a phenomenological foundation for the study of emotion and contrasts that approach with behavioral and cognitive paradigms. The paper attempts to reveal the inadequacy of those more mainstream contemporary paradigms and to establish the superiority of a phenomenological approach. In the history of psychology there have been many ways of explaining emotion, and this article will offer critiques of some of these significant paradigms. In presenting a phenomenological starting point as more adequate, the approaches of Magda Arnold and James Hillman will be explored to uncover valuable ways of describing and conceptualizing this complex human phenomenon. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
|Keywords||phenomenology qualitatively distinct emotion cognitive paradigms behavioral paradigms history of psychology|
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